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The question we address here is of whether phenomena of collective bankruptcies are related to
self-organized criticality. In order to answer it we propose a simple model of banking networks
based on the random directed percolation. We study effects of one bank failure on the nucleation of
contagion phase in a financial market. We recognize the power law distribution of contagion sizes
in 3d- and 4d-networks as an indicator of SOC behavior. The SOC dynamics was not detected in
2d-lattices. The difference between 2d- and 3d- or 4d-systems is explained due to the percolation
theory.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, physicists have intensively studied economic and social systems composed of many mutually inter-
acting parts [1, 2, 3, 4]. The methods borrowed from physics provided a better understanding of such phenomena
like crashes in a stock market [5], occurrence of extremely large market shares [6], and emergence of totalitarianism
in democratic societies [7, 8, 9, 10]. Like many other economic phenomena, collective bankruptcies arise from the
complex nature of financial and capital markets [11, 12, 13, 14]. Here we focus on one of the most extreme examples of
systemic failure, namely bank bankruptcies. We use banking terminology following our previous studies on interbank
markets [11], but the proposed model is general enough to describe many other types of collective failures.
As emphasized in [14], the history of modern banking is full of examples of systemic failures at both moderate and
large scales. Perhaps most of the readers are familiar with anecdotal accounts of the Great American Depression of
1929, or those of the 1997 East Asian crisis. On the other hand, very few people noticed financial troubles of Bank
S´la¸ski a few years ago in Poland. What is the reason behind the fact that one bankruptcy triggers off an avalanche
of further failures while other does not?
BANKING REALITY AND NETWORK MODEL
There are two main characteristics describing financial weakness of a bank: liquidity and solvency. Liquidity is the
ability to pay short-term commitments on time, whereas solvency encompasses all commitments. Loss of solvency is
a sufficient condition for bankruptcy and loss of liquidity is its necessary condition, respectively. Banks face shortfalls
and surpluses of money resulting from imbalances between revenues and expenses. This additional or lacking money
may be balanced via interbank lending. In this way interbank lending prevents banks from the loss of liquidity.
At present, interbank market is an important element of money market. In most of interbank markets the mean
transaction period is shorter than one month and still shortening. Moreover, the total amount of money in interbank
lending transactions exhibits a growing tendency. Banks are willing to invest their money into interbank market
because it is considered to bear the lowest risk, so that the lowest obligatory reserves have to be created for the given
credits. Examining the Polish data [15] we see that the average equity capital of a standard Polish bank amounts to
about ten percent of all liabilities. The same statistics report that the average value of assets located in interbank
market is close to fifteen percent. Regulations concerning bankruptcy, which are common for almost all financial
systems, define the bankruptcy condition as a loss of fifty percent of equity capital.
The numbers quoted show that interbank transactions constitute an important component of banking assets as well
as liabilities [12, 13, 15]. Single bankruptcies, through the network of credit and debt relationships, may seriously
threaten the entire banking system.
2In our model vertices on a lattice of the linear size L which for the simplicity has a regular symmetry (square,
cubic or 4d-hypercubic), represent banks. Directed junctions may be dynamically formed between neighboring nodes.
These directed connections simulate flows of money (interbank transactions, loans and credits). The paper follows our
model of mass bankruptcies based on the random directed percolation [11]. In comparison to previous work, the major
development of the present model is the implementation of the concept of banking balance, which when positive, can
be invested to make profits, but when negative, must be refilled to prevent the loss of liquidity. The next feature
distinguishing the proposed model from the previous one, where a constant concentration of interbank connections
was assumed, is assigning time-dependent weights to directed connections (i.e. credits) and vertices (i.e. banking
capitals).
The dynamical rules governing the temporal evolution of the model are as follows:
• Initially all banks are ’balanced’. During the following time steps each bank i, with equal probability, experiences
shortfalls or surpluses of money denoted by δi(t) (for simplicity δi(t) = ±1). After time t the banking capital
amounts to Θi(t) =
∑t
τ=1 δi(τ).
• At each time step banks with surpluses (Θi > 0) tend to invest their money, whereas banks with shortfalls
(Θi < 0) want to replenish their resources in order to maintain liquidity. The best place to realize both aims
is the interbank market. During trading, banking capital is redistributed within the nearest neighborhood of
a bank i.e. interbank financial transactions (loans and credits) arise. If a j-bank owes money to an i-bank we
denote the amount of the debt by dij > 0. It follows that Θi =
∑
<i,j> dij , where dij = −dji denotes the weight
of connection between the pair of neighbors < i, j > and dii expresses unbalanced money inside the bank i.
• If a bank has borrowed money in the past period (Θi < 0), its priority is to repay its creditors. Such a bank
when having a surplus (δi(t) > 0) will intend it for the payment of debts. On the other hand, a lender-bank
(Θi > 0) when having a short-lived liquidity troubles (dii < 0 and ∃j dij > 0) will collect money from its debtors
to eliminate a temporary financial problems.
• Bank goes bankrupt for either of the two reasons:
– because of the loss of solvency, when its capital falls below the ’solvency threshold’ Θi ≤ Θs, or
– because of the loss of liquidity, when unbalanced money inside a bank exceeds the ’liquidity threshold’
dii ≤ Θl where Θs < Θl < 0.
• Lender-banks that have given credits to a bankrupt lose their money. We assume that these banks become
’infected’ and they attempt to secure their positions by collecting their money from the debtors. The borrower-
banks that have to repay incurred debts are also assumed as ’infected’. These banks propagate infection to their
further uninfected lenders. The effect of contagion transmission by infected borrower-bank is related to the
situation when a lender having a contact with an infected debtor wants to protect itself against losses and tries
to collect given credits. In this way, a bankruptcy of a single bank may initiate an avalanche of bank failures
similarly to the domino effect well known in social and economic modeling.
• When the avalanche stops, new balanced banks (Θi = 0) are created to replace the failed ones.
The above dynamical rules of the model become comprehensible after examining Fig. 1 which presents an example
of a banking network on the square lattice of size 5 × 5. For simplicity we denote a bank located in the row k and
in the column l by the subscript i = (k − 1) ∗ 5 + l. The figure was generated under the following assumptions:
δi = ±1, Θs = −4, Θl = −2. A random set of variables Θi as an initial condition was assumed. There is no interbank
market at the first stage of the figure. Effects of interbank trading appear at the second stage. Arrows with single or
double arrowheads correspond to dij = ±1 or ±2 respectively. After trading, the interbank market is almost balanced.
Only one failure resulting from the loss of liquidity happened (the bank i = 16). However because there were no
commitments of this bank to its neighbours thus this bank failure did not lead to further network contagion. Let us
now assume that the last bank (i = 25) faces a shortfall (δ25 = −1) in the next time step (our model is governed by
asynchronous dynamics). This forces its immediate bankruptcy due to the loss of solvency (Θ25 = −4). The failure
infects two other banks with numbers 20 and 24 respectively. Since the 24th bank tries to collect the credit given to
19th bank it forces its failure according to the liquidity condition. The second bankruptcy infects the 18th bank. In
this way the contagion process originating from the 25th node triggers off a small avalanche of two failures within the
cluster of five ’infected’ / failed banks.
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FIG. 1: Dynamical rules in the model. Numbers describe the unbalanced money inside banks (dii). Black and grey dots denote
uninfected and infected banks respectively, while crosses correspond to failed banks.
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FIG. 2: Distributions of avalanches in square lattices
COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AND RESULTS
We investigated effects of a single bank failure on the nucleation of contagion phase in the banking network. The
simulations were done for square, cubic and 4d-hypercubic lattices. Although one could expect similar results for all
dimensions, we observe a noticeable difference in behavior. The distribution of infection area in the networks based
on square lattice is exponential (Fig.2), whereas the same dynamical rules in four-dimensional hypercubic lattices
generate power law distributions (Fig.4). The fact that the contagion in two-dimensional systems is characterized
by exponentially decaying distribution of stopping times indicates subcritical behavior. For 4d-hypercubic lattices,
the contagion process may continue infinitely as the result of long-range spatial and temporal correlations between
the participants of the interbank market. Three-dimensional cubic lattices described by different combinations of the
system parameters (Θs and Θl) exhibit a continuous transition from sub-critical to critical behavior of the model
(Fig.3).
These differences can be explained as follows. The expansion of the infection area corresponds to avalanches of
random directed percolation. On square lattices, the neighborhood of each vertex consists of only four vertices. In
terms of our model, it means that the average number of potential financial partners of a bank (neighbors whose
banking capital Θi has an opposite sign) equals to two. Given the above considerations, we conclude that the
average concentration of interbank connections q should not exceed fifty percent of all possible links in the lattice
(q ≤ 0.5). The random directed percolation threshold satisfies p2dc = 1.0 on square lattices [11]. Comparing two
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FIG. 3: Distributions of contagion area in 3d-cubic lattices. Top: semi-logarithmic plot, bottom: logarithmic plot
parameters q < p2dc makes it clear that two-dimensional banking networks always remain in the sub-critical region of
the percolation phase transition. On 4d-hypercubic lattices, the threshold amounts to p4dc ≈ 0.3202 while q ≤ 0.5. For
this reason the four-dimensional interbank market driven by threshold dynamics of the participants can balance at
the edge of percolation phase transition in a self-organized critical state almost regardless of the system parameters
values. On the other hand the three-dimensional percolation threshold p3dc ≈ 0.4976 is only slightly smaller than the
maximum concentration of interbank connections qmax = 0.5. Tuning the solvency threshold with the fixed liquidity
parameter shows that although the 3d-model tends to the self-organized critical dynamics, for certain combinations
of system parameters (Θs and Θl) the double security system consisting of liquidity and solvency monitoring keeps it
in the sub-critical region (Fig.3).
We interpret the power law (free-scale) distributions of failure sizes in 3d-cubic and 4d-hypercubic lattices as a
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FIG. 4: Distributions of avalanches in 4d-hypercubic lattices
symptom of self-organized critical behavior of the model. The slopes of the histograms approach the same value
τ3dSOC = τ
4d
SOC ≈ 1.50 ± 0.05 in both cases. Despite these reasonable power-laws indicating SOC dynamics, some
non-equilibrium effects in the model are not yet understood. Large systems in higher dimensions are particularly
sensitive to these effects.
To understand the SOC phenomenon on the microscopic level one needs to consider the dynamical character of
the system parameter q. In fact there are two competing processes that increase or decrease the mean number of
interbank connections q.
A. Due to the random character of the stochastic variable δi(t) and the random selection of a financial partners from
the nearest neighbors, the number of interbank connections q is growing up.
B. Due to collective bankruptcies the number of interbank connections q is falling down because new banks that
replace bankrupts are not involved in the interbank market at the beginning of their activity.
If the value of q is below the percolation threshold then the mean size of contagion cluster is small and the process
A overcomes the process B. It follows that in the course of time the number of interbank connections q is growing
up driving the system to the critical state. If the value of q exceeds a critical value (the percolation threshold) then
a large contagion cluster spreading all over the system can appear. As a result a lot of banks that were involved in
the network of interbank transactions face bankruptcy. The process B overcomes the process A and the parameter q
is diminishing.
DISCUSSION
The model presented here relates the phenomena of collective bankruptcies in banking networks to the self-organized
dynamics driving the system towards the critical point. Although a similar effect of power law scaling of collective
bank failures was partially discussed in [11, 14], the previous approaches were related to externally controlled critical
parameters and did not translate into terms of self-organized criticality. In the present model, due to the inclusion
of more realistic assumptions concerning the interbank market the connectivity parameter q can oscillate at the edge
of the phase transition. At this point we would like to stress, that however we abstract from details of banking
mechanisms and encompass all of them in only one parameter (the unit balance δi(t)) thanks to this simplification,
the model becomes more comprehensible and gains universality.
6One could imagine a number of further extensions of the model. Since the real banking networks do not possess
any regular symmetry it would be instructive to analyze the model from the point of view of the random graph
architecture. The model introduced here bases on the assumption of a fixed number of nearest neighbors. The above
situation is not observed in reality but as our results emphases, the artificial lowering of the dimensionality of the
network keeps the model in the subcritical state. Since in the four-dimensional network, the double security system
consisting of liquidity and solvency monitoring does not bring any effective control of the whole network security, the
control should be established over the number of debtors or amounts of the credits.
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